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Abstract 
With the rapid growth in internet technology anonymity, repudiation and smacking the contents of messages are 
required for illegal businesses such as money laundering etc. In this paper we design and analyze a proxy 
promised signcrypion scheme based on elliptic curve cryptosystem. In this system the sender/original signer can 
give the authority of signcrypion to another entity namely proxy signcrypter and he generates promised 
signcryptext on the place of sender. The scheme is accomplished aim to improve the previous crypto-systems, 
due to the elliptic curve small system parameter, small public key certificates, faster implementation, low power 
consumption and small hardware processor requirements. This ECC based scheme provides high security and 
efficiency. 
Keywords: proxy signature; promised signature; proxy signcrypion; promised signcrypion; elliptic curve. 
1. Introduction  
Dispatching and receiving Data/information through harm full channel needs safety. Data is the necessary part 
of any business organization. Now to safe data we require confidentiality which is provided by encryption 
algorithm. Authenticity is ensured by digital signature algorithm and integrity by one way hash function. 
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* Corresponding author. 
167 
International Journal of Computer (IJC) (2016) Volume 20, No  1, pp 167-173 
Before sending data the sender first encrypt data and then calculate signature of cipher text this method is called 
signature then encryption.it is time consuming and required  more machine cycle.to remove these limitations 
Zheng coin a word signcrypion [1]. It combines both digital signature and encryption in a single step with low 
computation and communication cost. But in some situation we collectively required rights delegations and 
deniability properties. For delegation of rights Membo introduce proxy signature scheme [2]. It enable the 
sender of a message to give the signing authority to another signer called proxy and he sign a message on behalf 
of sender.gamage extended proxy signature into proxy signcrypion [3],which combine both proxy signature and 
encryption in single logical step. For deniability Dwork proposed a deniable authentication [4]. It enables the 
sender to communicate secret with receiver without disclosing his privacy. Shin convert deniable authentication 
into promised Signcrypion which provides the property of anonymity and deniability [5]. According to promise 
property anyone can generate the promise Signcryptext but third party cannot prove the source of 
Signcryptext.in some situation we required deniability, anonymity and delegation of rights at the same time. 
Since there was no scheme to achieves these all property at once. For this we design a new scheme which 
fulfilling the above requirements called proxy promised signcrypion based on elliptic curve. 
2. Related work 
Zhang and Dong's [6] proposed a new scheme called public verifiable proxy signcrypion. The design scheme 
meets the security properties of public verifiability and forward secrecy. H. Elkamchouchi and his colleagues [7] 
introduce a proxy signcrypion scheme which work on the bases of Shin digital signature algorithm verifiable 
signcrypion. It ensures the security requirements confidentiality, authenticity and public verifiability. H. 
Elkamchouchi and his colleagues [8] contribute a proxy signcrypion for delegation of rights.it meet strong 
security because of it based on hard problems. Hearn and Jian [9] introduce a cryptographic base scheme 
supporting by PGP and S/MIME. The proposed scheme meet the property of denaiability.in proposed scheme 
only the intended receiver can validate the contents of message. The drawback of a proposed scheme is it needs 
more time for computation. Hwang and Jen [10] proposed Non-Interactive Fair Deniable Authentication 
Protocols with Indistinguishable Confidentiality and Anonymity. The proposed scheme realizes the security 
desires such as message confidentiality, anonymity and protection. The main disadvantage of the scheme is it is 
very time consuming. Mario and his colleagues [11] proposed a forwardly secure deniable authentication 
scheme. It provides the repudiation property. The limitation of this scheme is high computation cost. Chun hua 
and his colleagues [12] proposed a scheme that contributes the security models of certificate less deniable 
authentication protocol plus deniable authentication protocol work with certificate less cryptography.  
3. Proposed scheme   
This section presents our newly design proxy promissed signcryption scheme based on the hardeness of elliptic 
curve discrete logrithm problem.In this scheme the original signcrypter tranfer there sigcrypting ability to 
another person called proxy and the proxy signcrypter calculate the signcrypted cryptograme on the behalf of 
sender/original signcrypter.it contains key generation phase,sender/original signcrypter,proxy verification,proxy 
promised signcryption and unsigncryption phase. 
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3.1. Key Generation 
 Sender Choice randomely 𝑥𝑎  where 0<𝑥𝑎 < 𝑝 as the private key and also determine there public key 𝑌𝑎: 𝑌𝑎 = 𝑥𝑎𝐺 
Proxy Choice randomely 𝑥𝑝  where 0<𝑥𝑝 < 𝑝 as the private key and also determine there public key 𝑌𝑝: 𝑌𝑝 = 𝑥𝑝𝐺 
Reciver Choice randomely 𝑥𝑏  where 0<𝑥𝑏 < 𝑝 as the private key and also determine there public key 𝑌𝑏:𝑌𝑏 = 𝑥𝑏𝐺 
3.2. Sender/Original Signcrpter   
In this phase the original signer deligates the sigcrpted authority to another signcrypter called proxy.  
• Randomly chose 𝑅 
• Compute 𝐴 = 𝑅.𝐺 
• Compute𝜆 = �𝑅 − 𝑥𝑎 . ℎ(𝐴,𝑚𝑤)�𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 
Send (𝐴, 𝜆,𝑚𝑤)  to proxy 
3.3. Proxy verification 
In this phase the proxy verify that the message from original signcrypter or not. 
• Compute  𝐴′ = 𝜆.𝐺 + ℎ(𝐴,𝑚𝑤).𝑌𝑎  
3.4. Proxy Promised Signcrypion 
In this phase the proxy generate promised signcrypion of a message and then send to verifier. 
• Randomly generate two integer’s value a and b from [1……p-1] 
• Computes   𝜐 = ℎ1(𝛼.𝐺||m) 
• Computes  𝑠′ = �𝑎 + 𝜐. 𝑥𝑝�𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑞 
• Computes   𝑆 = 𝑠′.𝐺 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑞 
•  Computes key  𝐾 = ℎ2(𝑠′.𝑌𝑏) 
• Gain cipher text using this algorithm 𝐶 = 𝐸𝑘(𝑚||b) 
• Send (C, 𝜐, S) 
3.5.  Promise Un-Signcrypion 
• Compute key   𝐾 = ℎ2(𝑋𝑏 .𝑆) 
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•  Recovers the plaintext m using the same symmetric algorithm   𝑚||b = 𝐷𝑘(𝐶) 
• Compute   𝛾 = 𝑆 − 𝜐𝑌𝑝 
• Compute   𝜐′ = ℎ1(𝜐||m) 
• Accepts message 𝑚 if 𝜐 = υ′ 
4. Security analysis of proposed proxy promised signcrypion scheme 
The design scheme meet the security properties such as confidentiality, integrity of the warrant, unforgeability 
of a warrant, integrity of a message, authentication of a message, Deniability, Deniability, Intended Receive and 
Sender anonymity. 
4.1. Confidentiality 
The scheme ensures the property of confidentiality. If the attacker wants to decrypt the cipher text and get 
original contents of message. For this he must first get the secret session key𝐾 = ℎ2(𝑠′.𝑌𝑏).If he calculates key 
𝐾, then it should be going after the following cases. 
Case 1: the eavesdropper may effortlessly construct 𝑘 from (1). For this the attacker wants 𝑠′from  (2).now the 
construct 𝑠′  is equal to solve ECDLP (elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem) which is computationally hard 
for eavesdropper. 
𝐾 = ℎ2(𝑠′.𝑌𝑏)        (1)  
 𝑆 = 𝑠′.𝐺                  (2 )  
Case 2: the attacker can easily calculate  𝑠′  using (3).for this it required the randomly generated number 𝛼 from ( 4) and the proxy private key 𝑥𝑝 from ( 5).now it is equal to solve two unknown variable from same equation 
which is computationally infeasible for attacker.  
𝑠′ = �𝑎 + 𝜐. 𝑥𝑝�         (3) 
𝜐 = ℎ1(𝑎.𝐺||m)       (4) 
𝑌𝑝 = 𝑥𝑝.𝐺                  (5) 
4.2. Warrant Integrity 
The design scheme also ensures the integrity of warrant. Before sending the sender calculate the one way hash 
function of a warrant messageℎ(𝐴,𝑚𝑤) , sends to proxy .when attacker wants to change 𝑚𝑤 as  𝑚𝑤′. 𝑙𝑒𝑡  ℎ′(𝐴,  𝑚𝑤′ ) then he must calculate 𝜆 using (6) for this it needs the sender private key 𝑥𝑎 of sender from Eq. (7) 
and  𝑅 from Eq. (8) . Generating 𝑥𝑎  and 𝑑 is  infeasible for attacker and equivalent to solve two HECDLP 
.proxy can use the  Eq. (9)  for integrity if it hold equality then the message is not change otherwise change. 
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𝜆 = �𝑅 − 𝑥𝑎. ℎ(𝐴,𝑚𝑤)�              (6) 
𝑌𝑎 = 𝑥𝑎 .𝐺                                       (7) 
𝐴 = 𝑅.𝐺                                          (8) 
𝐴 = 𝜆.𝐷 + ℎ(𝐴,𝑚𝑤).𝑌𝑎                (9) 
  
4.3. Warrant unforgeability 
Our proposed scheme meets the property of warrant unforgeability. The attacker can calculate the valid 
signature for warrant using (6) .For this he required  𝑅 and sender private key 𝑥𝑎. Now finding of these two is 
hard and computationally infeasible for attacker.  
4.4. Massage Integrity 
In our proposed proxy promised signcrypion before sending the proxy first compute collision resistant hash 
function of message𝜐 = ℎ1(𝑎.𝐺||m)   and then refer to recipient. If the attacker wants to convert cipher text 𝑐 
into 𝑐′  then it must change 𝑚  into 𝑚′ .but we use a collision resistant one way hash function which is 
computational infeasible for  attacker. 
4.5. Authenticity  
The proposed scheme also meets the property of authentication. In design scheme when the attacker wants to 
compute a forge signature for a message then he first calculate 𝑎 from ( 4),  also the private key of a proxy 𝑥𝑝 
𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 ( 5). Now it equals to finding two unknown values from same equation is computationally hard for 
attacker. The receiver checks the integrity of message using (10). 
𝑌𝑝 = 𝑠′.𝐺 −  𝑎.𝐺𝜐               (10)                   
4.6. Deniability 
The design proxy promised signcrypion provides the property of repudiation. Because anyone uses the private 
key of receiver can generate the forge signature and cipher text. Eavesdropper can easily generate same 
signature and cipher text 𝑐′using the following steps.  
• Attacker Compute 𝐾′=𝐻2(𝑠′.𝑋𝑏). 
• And Calculates 𝐶′ = 𝐸𝑘(𝑚||b′). 
• Then generate the forge promise Signcrypion of message m is (𝐶′, 𝛾′, 𝑆′ ) where  𝜐′ = 𝑆′ − 𝜐′𝑌𝑎 . And 
𝐾 = 𝐾′ so any one can generate the promised signcryptext of (𝐶, 𝜐, 𝑆) which is lead to the repudiation 
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property. 
4.7. Intended Receive 
In our proposed scheme only the intended receiver can verify the validity of a message using following 
equations. 
 𝑆 = 𝜐 + 𝜐𝑌𝑝               (11) 
𝛾 = ℎ(𝜐) = ℎ( 𝜐′)   (12) 
                                                                    ℎ(𝜐||m) = h(𝜐′||m)  (13) 
4.8. Sender anonymity 
To know the source of message the attacker generates a forge promise (  𝜐′, 𝑆′) of (𝜐, 𝑆) then randomly choose a 
bit string  𝐶′ and then forge promise signcryptext 𝐶, 𝜐, 𝑆 .Thus one the sender and receiver can decrypt and 
validate signcryptext according to the promise property. But eavesdropper cannot validate using 𝜐′, 𝑆′. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper presents the new scheme called proxy promised signcrypion. The security of a scheme realizes on 
bases of a hardiness of elliptic curve cryptosystem. The scheme is suitable for constrained environment devices 
because of elliptic curve which has the property of rapid implementations, having little public key, shorter 
parameter, small power consumption and small hardware processing requirements.  
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